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BLACK BOX ALGEBRA AND HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
Abstract. In the present paper, we study homomorphic encryption [37] as
an area where principal ideas of black box algebra are particularly transparent.
This paper is a compressed summary of some principal definitions and concepts
in the approach to the black box algebra being developed by the authors
[15]. We suggest that black box algebra could be useful in cryptanalysis of
homomorphic encryption schemes, and that homomorphic encryption is an
area of research where cryptography and black box algebra may benefit from
exchange of ideas.
1. Homomorphic encryption
1.1. Homomorphic encryption and black box algebra. “Cloud computing”
appears to be a hot topic in information technology; in a nutshell, this is the abil-
ity of small and computationally weak devices to delegate hard resource-intensive
computations to third party (and therefore untrusted) computers. To ensure the
privacy of the data, the untrusted computer should receive data in an encrypted
form but still being able to process it. It means that encryption should preserve
algebraic structural properties of the data.
This is one of the reasons for popularity of the idea of homomorphic encryption
[1, 2, 36, 37, 39, 40, 48, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72] which we describe here with some sim-
plifications aimed at clarifying connections with black box algebra, that is, part of
computational algebra which deals with algebraic structures (fields, rings, groups,
semigroups, etc.) represented by black boxes as defined in Section 2.1. Alterna-
tively, black box algebra can be described as a study of categories where objects
are algebraic structures with algebraic operations on them computable in proba-
bilistic time polynomial in the input length, and morphisms are also computable in
probabilistic polynomial time. The key aspect of black box algebra is that bijective
morphisms can not be automatically assumed to be invertible.
1.2. Homomorphic encryption: basic definitions. Let A and X denote the
sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts, respectively, and assume that we have some (say,
binary) operators ⊡A on A needed for processing data and corresponding operators
⊡X on X. An encryption function E is homomorphic if
E(a1 ⊡A a2) = E(a1)⊡X E(a2)
for all plaintexts a1, a2 and all operations on A.
Suppose Alice is the owner of data represented by plaintexts in A which she would
like to process using operators ⊡A, but has insufficient computation resources,
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while Bob has computational facilities for processing ciphertexts using operators
⊡X. Alice may wish to enter into a contract with Bob; in a realistic scenario, Alice
is one of the many customers of the encrypted data processing service run by Bob,
and all customers use the same formats of data and operators which are for that
reason are likely to be known to Bob. This is what is known in cryptology as
Kerchkoff’s Principle: obscurity is no security, the security of encryption should
not rely on details of the protocol being held secret; see [37] for historic details.
Alice encrypts plaintexts a1 and a2 and sends ciphertexts E(a1) and E(a2) to
Bob.
Bob computes
b = E(a1)⊡X E(a2)
without having access to the content of plaintexts a1 and a2, then return the output
b to Alice who decrypts it using the decryption function E−1:
E−1(b) = a1 ⊡A a2
In this set-up, we shall say the homomorphic encryption scheme is based on the
algebraic structure A or that the homomorphism E is a homomorphic encryption
of the algebraic structure A.
To simplify exposition, we assume that the encryption function E is determinis-
tic, that is, E establishes a one-to-one correspondence between A and X. Of course,
this is a strong assumption in the cryptographic context; it is largely unnecessary
for our analysis, but, for the purposes of this paper, allows us to avoid technical
details and makes it easier to explain links with the black box algebra.
1.3. Back to algebra. In algebraic terms, A and X as introduced above are al-
gebraic structures (non-empty sets with operations on them which we refer to as
algebraic operations) and
E : A −→ X
is a homomorphism.
In this paper we assume that the algebraic structure A is finite. This is not
really essential for our analysis, many observations are relevant for the infinite case
as well, but handling probability distributions (that is, random elements) on infinite
sets is beyond the scope of the present paper.
We discuss a class of potential attacks on homomorphic encryption which are
based on a simple but fundamental fact of algebra: a map
E : A −→ B
of algebraic structures of the same type is a homomorphism if and only if its graph
Γ(E) = {(a,E(a)) | a ∈ A}
is a substructure A×B, that is, closed under all algebraic operations on A×B.
Obviously, Γ(E) is isomorphic to A. If A has rich internal configuration (has
many substructures with complex interaction between them, automorphisms, etc.)
so is Γ(E).
As it will be demonstrated in this paper using a few examples from black box
algebra,
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If an algebraic structure A has a rich internal configura-
tion, the graph Γ(E) of a homomorphic encryption function
E : A −→ X also has a rich (admittedly hidden) internal
configuration, and this could make it vulnerable to a po-
tential attack from Bob.
We suggest that,
before attempting to develop a homomorphic encryption
scheme based on a particular algebraic structure A, the
latter needs to be examined by black box theory methods
– as examples in this paper show, it could happen that all
homomorphic encryption schemes on A are insecure.
2. A black box attack on homomorphic encryption
As explained in Section 1, we assume that the algebraic structure A of plaintexts
is represented in some standard form known to Bob. In agreement with the standard
language of algebra – and with our terminology in [15] – we shall use the words
plain element or just element in place of ‘plaintext’ and cryptoelement in place of
‘ciphertext’.
We assume that Bob can accumulate a big dataset of cryptoelements sent from/to
Alice, or intermediate results from running Alice’s programme, and that he can feed,
without knowledge of Alice, cryptoelements into a computer system (the black box )
which performs operations on them, and retain the outputs for peruse – again
without Alice’s knowledge. Bob’s aim is to compute the decryption function E−1
in an efficient way, that is, in probabilistic time polynomial in terms of the lengths
of plain elements and cryptoelements involved.
This setup can be described as a black box algebraic structure and is defined
axiomatically in Section 2.1.
2.1. Axiomatic description of black box algebraic structures. A black box
algebraic structure X is a black box (or an oracle, or a device, or an algorithm)
operating with 0–1 strings of uniform length which encrypt (not necessarily in a
unique way) elements of some algebraic structure A.
In algorithms described in this paper, we have to build new black boxes (fre-
quently for the same algebraic structure) from existing ones and work with several
black box structures at once. For that reason we specify the functionality of a
family X of black boxes X by the following axioms.
BB1 Each X produces cryptoelements as strings of fixed length l(X) (which de-
pends on X) encrypting random (almost) uniformly distributed elements
from some algebraic structure A; this is done in probabilistic time polyno-
mial in l(X).
BB2 Each X computes, in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X), cryptoelements
encrypting the outputs of algebraic operations applied to given cryptoele-
ments.
BB3 Each X decides, in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X), whether two cryp-
toelements encrypt the same element in A.
We shall say in this situation that a black box X encrypts the algebraic structure
A.
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So far, it appears that only finite groups, fields, rings, and, very recently, pro-
jective planes (in our paper [15]) got a black box treatment.
Black box algebraic structures had been introduced by Babai and Szeme´redi [9]
in the special case of groups as an idealized setting for randomized algorithms for
solving permutation and matrix group problems in computational group theory.
Our Axioms BB1–BB3 is a slight modification – and generalisation to arbitrary
algebraic structures – of their original axioms. Black box groups have proved to be
very useful in computational group theory.
In case of finite fields, the concept of a black box field can be traced back to
Lenstra Jr [53], Boneh [13], and Boneh and Lipton [12], and in case of rings – to
Arvind [4].
2.2. Construction of new black boxes. An example of a new black box algebraic
structure built from old ones is a direct product X×Y of two black box structures X
and Y encrypting algebraic structures A and B, correspondingly; its cryptoelements
are pairs (x, y) with components being cryptoelements independently produced by
X and Y, correspondingly, and operations performed componentwise by the two
black boxes.
A homomorphic image Y of the black box X under a homomorphism α : X −→ Y
can be seen as having the same strings as X and the same algebraic operations but
a redefined equality relation (a ‘congruence” in terminology of abstract algebra)
y1 =Y y2 with the property that
y1 =Y y2 ⇐⇒ α(y1) = α(y2);
this explains why Axiom BB3 is useful.
The reader will find in this paper a variety of other black box constructions.
2.3. Black boxes associated with homomorphic encryption. Returning to
the homomorphic encryption setup, we see that A can be seen as the set of plain
elements, and X as the set of cryptoelements, and the encryption function E as an
isomorphism E : A −→ X.
Supply of random cryptoelements from X postulated in Axiom BB1 can be
achieved by sampling a big dataset of cryptoelements provided by Alice, or com-
puted on request from Alice. The computer system controlled by Bob performs
algebraic operations referred to in Axiom BB2.
Axiom BB3 is redundant under the assumption that E : A −→ X is a bijection,
but gives us more freedom to construct new black boxes, for example, homomorphic
images of X. It could also be useful for handling another quite possible scenario:
For Alice, the cost of computing homomorphisms E and E−1 could be higher than
the price charged by Bob for processing cryptoelements. In that case, it could be
cheaper to transfer initial data to Bob (in encrypted form) and ask Bob to run
a computer programme which uses the black box but does not send intermediate
values back to Alice and returns to Alice only the final result. In that case, it
becomes almost inevitable to have, among operation done by the black box, com-
paring the values of two cryptoelements – thus making Axiom BB3 necessary for
the description of the black box.
2.4. Bob’s attack. As we have already explained, we can assume that Bob knows
the algebraic structure A.
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Bob’s aim is to find an algorithm which works in probabilistic time polynomial in
l(X) and maps cryptoelements from X to elements in A and vice versa while preserv-
ing the algebraic operations on X and A. In our terminology (see Section 4.1), this
means solving the constructive recognition problem for X, that is, finding efficient
isomorphisms
α : X −→ A
β : A −→ X
such that α ◦ β is the identity map on A.
Here and in the rest of the paper, “efficient” means “computable in probabilistic
time polynomial in the input length”.
Assume that Bob solved the constructive recognition problem and can efficiently
compute α and β.
Alice’s encryption function is a map E : A −→ X; the composition δ = α ◦ E is
an automorphism of A. Therefore Bob reads not Alice’s plaintexts a ∈ A, but their
images δ(a) = α(E(a)) under an automorphism δ of A still unknown to him.
This means that
solving the constructive recognition problem for X reduces
the problem of inverting the encryption homomorphism
E : A −→ X to a much simpler problem of inverting the
automorphism
δ : A −→ A.
We are again in the situation of homomorphic encryption, but this time the sets of
plaintexts and ciphertexts are the same. One would expect that this encryption is
easier to break. For example, if Bob can guess the plaintexts of a few cryptoele-
ments, and if the automorphism group AutA of A is well understood, computation
of δ and δ−1 could be a more accessible problem than the constructive recognition
for X. For example, automorphism groups of finite fields are very small, and in that
case δ−1 can be found by direct inspection.
As soon as δ−1 is known, Bob knows
E−1 = δ−1 ◦ α
and can decrypt everything.
Moreover, the map E is also known:
E = β ◦ δ,
and allows Bob to return to Alice cryptoelements which encrypt plaintexts of Bob’s
choice.
We suggest that this approach to analysis of homomorphic encryption is useful
because it opens up connections to black box algebra. Indeed the theory of black
box structures is reasonably well developed for groups and fields, and its methods
could provide insight into assessment of security of other algebraic structures if any
are proposed for use in homomorphic encryption.
In Sections 3 and 5 (the latter is based on our papers [15, 21]), we give an
example of how this perhaps could be done.
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3. Black box fields
We define black box fields as a special case of black box algebraic structure,
and invite the reader to compare our exposition with [13]. Notice that we slightly
generalize the definition of a black box field given in [13, 56] by removing the
assumption that the characteristic of the field is known.
A black box (finite) field K is an oracle or an algorithm operating on 0-1 strings
of uniform length (input length) which encrypts some finite field F. The oracle can
compute x+ y, xy, and x−1 (the latter for x 6= 0 and decide whether x = y for any
strings x, y ∈ K. If the characteristic p of K is known then we say that K is a black
box field of known characteristic p. We refer the reader to [13, 56] for more details
on black box fields of known characteristic and their applications to cryptography.
Maurer and Raub [56] proved that a construction of an isomorphism and its
inverse between a black box field K of known characteristic p and an explicitly
given field Fpn is reducible in polynomial time to the same problem for the prime
subfield in K and the field Fp.
Using our terminology, their proof can be reformulated to yield the following
result.
Theorem 3.1. Let K be a black box field of known characteristic p encrypting an
explicitly given finite field Fpn and K0 the prime subfield of K. Then the problem of
finding efficient two way isomorphisms between K and Fpn can be efficiently reduced
to the same problem for K0 and Fp. In particular,
• an isomorphism
K0 −→ Fp
can be extended in time polynomial in the input length l(K) to a probabilistic
polynomial in l(K) time isomorphism
K −→ Fpn ;
• there exists an isomorphism Fpn −→ K computable in polynomial in l(K)
time.
If charK = p and p is known, we can easily find an isomorphism Fp −→ K0.
Indeed, the standard representation of Fp is
Fp = Z/pZ
and elements of Fp are represented by integers
0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1,
coset representatives of pZ in the additive group Z. Let 1 be the unit in K0, then
the map
n 7→ 1+ 1+ · · ·+ 1 (n times)
is a desired isomorphism Fp −→ K0; it is computable in linear in log p time by the
classical double-and-add method.
The existence of the reverse isomorphism Fp ←− K0 would follow from a solution
of the discrete logarithm problem in K0. In particular, this means that
for small primes p, for every black box field K of order pn
there is a probabilistic polynomial in n log p time isomor-
phism to an explicitly given field Fpn.
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This means that, for small primes p, there are no secure homomorphic encryption
schemes based on finite fields of characteristic p.
4. Black box groups
In various classes of black box problems for groups the isomorphism type of the
encrypted group A could be known in advance or unknown.
Some of the problems arising in relation to black box groups could be formulated
in a wider context of arbitrary algebraic structures.
4.1. Black box problems for algebraic structures. Given a black box algebraic
structure X, we usually deal with one of the following problems and wish to find
solution in probabilistic polynomial in l(X) time.
A. Verification problem. Is X isomorphic to the structure A given is some
explicit form?
B. Identification problem. Determine, with the given degree of certainty, the
isomorphism type of X, that is, find an algebraic structure A given in some
explicit form and such that X encrypts a structure B isomorphic to A.
C. Constructive recognition. Find isomorphisms
X←→ A
between X and an explicitly given algebraic structure A computable in
probabilistic time polynomial in l(X).
4.2. Structure recovery. The following problem is specific for groups, it could be
seen as a weaker form of constructive recognition for a wide class of simple groups.
D. Structure recovery. Suppose that a black box group X encrypts a concrete
and explicitly given group G of Lie type (for example, a classical matrix
group) over an explicitly given finite field Fq. To achieve a structure recovery
in X means to construct, in probabilistic polynomial in l(X) time,
– a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
– probabilistic polynomial time isomorphisms
Ψ : G(K) −→ X
and
Ψ−1 : X −→ G(K).
Structure recovery plays crucial role in algorithms developed in the proof of
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2.
4.3. Monte–Carlo and Las Vegas. By the nature of our axioms, all algorithms
for black box algebraic structures as randomized objects (and, in particular, all
expected solutions for problems A – D above) are probabilistic Monte-Carlo algo-
rithms.
Recall that a Monte-Carlo algorithm is a randomized algorithm which gives a
correct output to a decision problem with probability strictly bigger than 1
2
. The
probability of having incorrect output can be made arbitrarily small by running
the algorithm sufficiently many times. A special case of Monte–Carlo algorithms is
a Las Vegas algorithm which either outputs a correct answer or reports failure. A
detailed comparison of Monte–Carlo and Las Vegas algorithms, both from practical
and theoretical point, can be found in [6].
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In the case of black box groups, many algorithms can be made Las Vegas under
some additional information about the encrypted group.
4.4. Examples of black box groups. As we have already explained in Sec-
tion 2.4, theory of black box groups, as better developed, could serve as a paradigm
for study of security of homomorphic encryption. There are two older areas where
black box groups appear:
4.4.1. The Miller-Rabin primality test. As explained in [14], the celebrated Miller-
Rabin primality test [68] amounts to treating the multiplicative group (Z/nZ)∗ as
a black box X (with random elements produced by a random numbers generator)
and testing whether X encrypts the cyclic group Zn−1; if the answer is NO, n is not
a prime number.
The Miller-Rabin primality test is an archetypal black box verification problem.
4.4.2. Matrix groups. An important example of a black box group is provided by
a group G generated in an ambient matrix group GLn(Fpk) by several matrices
g1, . . . , gl [49]. The Babai’s algorithm [5] or a much more efficient product replace-
ment algorithm [30] produces a sample of (almost) independent elements from a
distribution on G which is close to the uniform distribution – see a discussion and
further development in [8, 38, 63, 64, 65]. We can, of course, multiply, invert, com-
pare matrices. Therefore the computer routines for these operations together with
the sampling of the product replacement algorithm run on the tuple of generators
(g1, . . . , gl) can be viewed as a black box X encrypting the group G. The group G
could be unknown—in which case we are interested in its isomorphism type—or its
isomorphism type could be known, as it happens in a variety of other black box
problems.
So matrix groups provide a variety of problems of every class – from verification
to constructive recognition.
Translated into the homomorphic encryption context, recognition of matrix groups
becomes a problem of recovery of Alice’s secret homomorphism
E : A −→ GLn(Fpk)
(a representation of A, in terminology of representation theory of groups). From the
cryptographic point of view, this problem is mostly of theoretical interest because
the cost of computing the homomorphisms E and E−1 is likely to be incomparably
higher than the cost of matrix operation in GLn(Fpk).
There is considerable literature on black box matrix groups, here is a list: [3, 7,
10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 73, 74]. Most of these
works are conditional on the assumption that the Discrete Logarithm Problem can
be solved in the field GLn(Fpk); many of them also assume the availability of the so-
called SL2-Oracle which, given a subgroup L in GLn(Fpk) isomorphic to SL2(Fpl),
constructs an isomorphism between L and SL2(Fpl).
Our approach to black box groups was developed for solving some harder prob-
lems in matrix groups recognition without use of the Discrete Logarithm and SL2-
Oracles [15, 21]. Moreover, our paper [15] eliminates the need for SL2-Oracle in the
study of black box matrix groups.
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When working on our paper [15], we discovered that the homomorphic encryption
context sheds new light on, and allows to clarify, the nature of the key concepts in
the black box group theory—this is what we discuss in this paper.
5. Two black box groups
Two procedures described in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 below are reformulations of
principal results of papers [21] and [15] in a homomorphic encryption setup. In our
discussion, they demonstrate the depth of structural analysis involved and suggest
that a similarly deep but revealing structural theory can be developed for other
algebraic structures if they are sufficiently rich for use in homomorphic encryption.
Also, it is worth noting that the procedures do not use any assumptions about the
encryption homomorphism E, the analysis is purely algebraic.
5.1. SL3(Fq).
Theorem 5.1. Assume that Alice and Bob run a homomorphic encryption protocol
based on the special linear group A = SL3(Fq) (that is, the group of 3× 3 matrices
over Fq with determinant 1), q odd, with Bob doing computations with cryptoele-
ments using a black box X. Assume that Bob knows A, including the representation
of the field Fq used by Alice.
Then:
(a) As shown in [21], Bob can solve the structure recovery problem for the black
box X and construct, in probabilistic polynomial in log q time,
– a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
– probabilistic polynomial in log q time isomorphisms
Ψ : SL3(K) −→ X
and
Ψ−1 : X −→ SL3(K).
(b) If, in addition, Bob has an algorithm for probabilistic polynomial in log q
time isomorphisms between a black box field K and the explicitly given field
Fq (for example, if the characteristic of Fq is small, see Theorem 3.1), he
gets probabilistic polynomial in log q isomorphisms X←→ SL3(Fq).
(c) Since Alice’s group A is also standard SL3(Fq), then, under assumptions of
(b), Bob gets an image of Alice’s data transformed by an automorphism
δ : SL3(Fq) −→ SL3(Fq).
(d) Automorphisms of the group SL3(Fq) are well known: every automorphism
of SL3(Fq) is a product of a conjugation by a matrix from GL3(Fq), the
inverse-transpose automorphism and a field automorphism induced by an
automorphism of the field Fq. Therefore if Bob can run a few instances of
known plaintexts attacks against Alice, he can compute the automorphism
δ and after that read plaintexts of all Alice’s cryptoelements.
(e) Moreover, under assumptions of (b) and (d), Bob can compute the inverse
of δ and pass to Alice, as answers to Alice’s requests, values of his choice.
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5.2. A more sophisticated example: PGL2(Fq).
Theorem 5.2. Assume that Alice and Bob run a homomorphic encryption protocol
over the group A = PGL2(Fq), q odd, with Bob doing computations with cryptoele-
ments using a black box X. Assume that Bob knows A, including the representation
of the field Fq used by Alice.
Then:
(a) As shown in [15], Bob can solve the structure recovery problem for the black
box X and construct, in probabilistic polynomial in log q time,
– a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
– probabilistic polynomial time isomorphisms
Ψ : SO3(K) −→ X
and
Ψ−1 : X −→ SO3(K).
(b) If, in addition, Bob has an algorithm for probabilistic polynomial in log q
time, isomorphisms between a black box field K and the explicitly given field
Fq (for example, if the characteristic of Fq is small, see Theorem 3.1),
he gets two ways probabilistic polynomial in log q isomorphisms X ←→
SO3(Fq).
(b’) The Alice’s group A = PGL2(Fq) and the group SO3(Fq) are isomorphic,
but have different representations: PGL2(Fq) by 2× 2 projective matrices,
SO3(Fq) by 3 × 3 matrices over Fq. But computing efficient deterministic
isomorphisms SO3(Fq)←→ PGL2(Fq) is a simple problem of linear algebra.
(c) Since Alice’s group A is an explicitly given PGL2(Fq), then, under assump-
tions of (b), Bob gets an image of Alice’s data transformed by an automor-
phism
δ : PGL2(Fq) −→ PGL2(Fq).
(d) Automorphisms of the group PGL2(Fq) are well known: every automor-
phism of PGL2(Fq) is a product of a conjugation by a matrix from GL2(Fq)
and a field automorphism induced by an automorphism of the field Fq.
Therefore if Bob can run a few instances of known plaintexts attacks against
against Alice, he can compute the automorphism δ and after that read plain-
texts of all Alice’s cryptoelements.
(e) Moreover, under assumptions of (b) and (d), Bob can compute the inverse
of δ and pass to Alice, as answers to Alice’s requests, values of his choice.
5.3. Black box projective planes. An interesting stage in proofs of Theorems
5.1 and 5.2 is construction of a black box projective plane P, a structure with
two sorts of elements, points and lines, and with two partial operations performed
by a black box: computing the line p ∨ q incident to two distinct points p 6= q,
and computing the point m ∧ n incident to two distinct lines m 6= n. The black
box field K is obtained by coordinatization of the projective plane P, and the
action of X on P by collineations (again, performed by a black box) produces,
in appropriately chosen projective coordinates on P, the homomorphisms X −→
PGL3(K) which have images PSL3(K) and SO3(K), when X encrypts SL3(F) and
PGL2(F), respectively. The map X −→ PSL3(K) is then lifted to X −→ SL3(K).
The ways how the projective plane P is constructed are very different in the
two theorems; in particular, the projective plane of Theorem 5.2 has an additional
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operation (performed by a black box): polarity, an involution which sends points
to lines and lines to points while preserving the incidence relation. This polarity
is invariant under the action by X, which forces X to be an orthogonal group in
dimension 3.
5.4. Discussion. Points (d) and (e) in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 above look as serious
vulnerabilities of homomorphic encryptions of PGL2(Fq) and SL3(Fq).
We come to conclusion that homomorphic encryption of groups PGL2(Fq) and
SL3(Fq) is no more secure than homomorphic encryption of the field Fq. As a
consequence of Theorem 3.1, homomorphic encryption of PGL2(Fq) and SL3(Fq)
for q = pk does not survive a known plaintext attack when the prime p > 2 is small.
One of the reasons why the groups PGL2(Fq) and SL3(Fq) happened to be vul-
nerable is that they have rich internal structure which allows us to build new black
boxes and carry our sophisticated algebraic constructions. We believe that the same
applies to all classical matrix groups:
Conjecture 5.3. Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 remains true if we replace groups SL3(Fq)
and PGL2(Fq), q odd, by any classical matrix group of dimension n over Fq – with
the only difference that algorithms which reduce an attack on encryption of a group
to a similar attack on encryption of a field have complexity polynomial in n log q.
We have already achieved significant progress towards a proof of this conjecture.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 serve as a basis of induction on n.
This allows us to formulate a more general conclusion:
Conjecture 5.4. Homomorphic encryption of classical matrix groups over
finite fields is not safer than homomorphic encryption of their underly-
ing fields.
6. Morphisms and protomorphisms
In this section we explain some crucial ideas behind the proof of Theorems 5.1
and 5.2; in particular, we give examples where graphs of homomorphisms are treated
as (black box) groups – we emphasised this point in Section 1.
6.1. Morphisms. For a black box group X encrypting a group G, the canonical
projection πX : X −→ G maps every cryptoelement in X to the corresponding ele-
ment in G. We are not making any assumptions about the feasibility of computing
this map in practice.
Given two black boxes X and Y encrypting finite groups G and H , respectively,
we say that a map ζ which assigns cryptoelements from X to cryptoelements from
Y is a morphism of black box groups, if
• the map ζ is computable in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X) and l(Y),
and
• there is a homomorphism φ : G → H such that the following diagram is
commutative:
X
ζ
✲ Y
G
piX
❄
.........
φ
✲ H
piY
❄
.........
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where πX πY are the canonical projections of X and Y onto G and H ,
respectively.
We shall say in this situation that a morphism ζ encrypts the homomorphism φ.
To give one example, morphisms arise naturally when a black box group X is
given by a generating set of cryptoelements and we replace a generating set for
the black box group X by a more convenient one and start sampling the product
replacement algorithm for the new generating set; in fact, we replace a black box
for X and deal with a morphism Y −→ X from the new black box Y into X.
We say that a morphism ζ is an embedding, or an epimorphism, etc., if φ has
these properties. Dotted arrows are reserved for abstract (that is, unknown, or of
unknown complexity) homomorphisms, including natural projections
X .......
piX
✲ π(X);
the latter are not necessarily morphisms, since, by the very nature of black box
problems, we are not given an efficient procedure for constructing the projection of
a black box onto the (explicitly given) group it encrypts.
6.2. Black box subgroups. If we have an embedding of black box groups Y →֒ X,
we shall say that Y is a subgroup of X.
In our papers [15, 21], black box subgroups are constructed in one of the following
ways:
• We generate Y by some cryptoelements y1, . . . , ym ∈ X and use some version
of the product replacement algorithm [30] for random sampling.
• Given black box subgroups Y1, . . . ,Yk in X, we generate a subgroup
Y = 〈Y1, . . . ,Yk〉
by taking generating sets in Yi and combining them into a generating set
in Y.
• Y is the centralizer in X of an involution or a proto-involution in the sense
of Section 6.5 when we apply the procedure described in [14] to “populate”
Y and eventually find a generating set for Y.
6.3. Morphisms as black box groups. We recall again that a map
G ..........
φ
✲ H
from a group to a group is a homomorphism of groups if and only if its graph
F = {(g, φ(g)) : g ∈ G}
is a subgroup of G×H .
Recall construction of direct products of black boxes (Section 2.2): if X encrypts
G and Y encryptsH then the black box X×Y produces pairs of cryptoelements (x, y)
by sampling X and Y independently, with operations carried out componentwise in
X and Y; of course, X× Y encrypts G×H .
This allows us to treat a morphism
X ..........
ζ
✲ Y
of black box groups as a black box subgroup Z →֒ X× Y encrypting F :
Z = {(x, ζ(x)) : x ∈ X}
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with the natural projection
πZ : Z −→ F
(x, ζ(x)) 7→ (πX(x), φ(πX(x)).
In practice it means that we can find cryptoelements x1, . . . , xk generating X
with known images y1 = ζ(x1), . . . , yk = ζ(xk) in Y and then use the product
replacement algorithm to run a black box for the subgroup
Z = 〈(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉 6 X× Y
which is of course exactly the graph { (x, ζ(x) } of the homomorphism ζ. Random
sampling of the black box Z returns cryptoelements x ∈ X with their images ζ(x) ∈ Y
already attached.
6.4. Protomorphisms. Let X and Y be two black box groups encryptingG andH ,
respectively, and π the canonical projection of X×Y onto G×H . A protomorphism
Z between black box groups X and Y is a black box subgroup Z < X×Y such that
π(Z) is the graph of a homomorphism from G to H or from H to G—the direction
of homomorphism is not set here. We say that Z encrypts this homomorphism.
We frequently construct new black boxes from the given ones, and in these
constructions cryptoelements in X act as pointers to other black boxes. Therefore
it is convenient to think of elements of black boxes as other black boxes—the same
way as in the ZF set theory all objects are sets, with some sets being elements of
others. A projective plane constructed in [15] provides a good example: it could be
seen as consisting of points and lines, where a “line” is a black box that produces
random “points” on this line and a “point” is a black box that produces random
“lines” passing through this point.
In a black box group X, it is frequently useful to associate with an element
encrypted by a cryptoelement x ∈ X a black box for the graph of a specific ho-
momorphism, namely, the conjugation by x, viewed as a subgroup of the direct
product X × X, the latter provided with group operations and equality relation in
the obvious way:
Cx = {(y, y
x) : y ∈ X}.
Treating a homomorphism X −→ Y of black box groups X and Y as a black box
subgroup in their direct product X × Y has happened to be an effective way of
working with automorphisms of black box groups, as can be seen, for example, in
“reification of involutions”, see Section 6.5; more detail can be found in [15].
6.5. Amalgamation of local proto-involutions. Let X be a black box group
encrypting a group G. Expanding the terminology from the previous section, a
proto-involution F on X is a black box subgroup F < X × X for the graph of an
involutive automorphism of X.
Assume that black box subgroups Y1, . . . ,Yk in X are encrypting, respectively,
subgroups H1, . . . , Hk in G, and assume that 〈H1, . . . , Hk〉 = G. Assume that
φ1, . . . , φk are involutive automorphisms of subgroups H1, . . . , Hk, respectively, and
Fi are proto-involutions on Yi encrypting φi, i = 1, . . . , k. We say that the system
of proto-involutions F1, . . . ,Fk is consistent if there exists an automorphism φ of G
such that φi = φ |Hi for all i = 1, . . . , k.
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Theorem 6.1 (Amalgamation of local proto-involutions). If F1, . . . ,Fk is a con-
sistent system of proto-involutions on black box subgroups Y1, . . . ,Yk of X, then
F = 〈F1, . . . ,Fk〉
is a proto-involution on X.
Proof. The proof is self-evident. 
We shall call F the amalgam of proto-involutions F1, . . . ,Fk.
6.6. Reification. Theorem 6.1 was systematically used in proofs of Theorems 5.1
and 5.2. It was very useful because proto-involutions can be converted into actual
involutions, that is, cryptoelements in X:
Theorem 6.2 (Reification Theorem, [15]). Let X be a black box groups encrypting
a simple group G of Lie type and odd characteristic. Assume that F is a proto-
involution on X encrypting an involutive internal automorphism of G induced by
some (unknown to us) involution t ∈ G. Then we can construct, in probabilistic
time polynomial in l(X), an involution t ∈ X encrypting t.
This is an example of the technique borrowed from the computer science and
known as reification. According to a widely accepted description,
Reification is the process by which an abstract idea about a com-
puter program is turned into an explicit data model or other object
created in a programming language. A computable/addressable
object – a resource – is created in a system as a proxy for a non
computable/addressable object.
In Theorem 6.2, a proto-involution is a proxy object used for a construction of
a specific object, a string in X encrypting an involution with specified properties.
Black box projective planes and fields mentioned in Section 5 are also proxies. The
power of abstract algebra is in its ability to define, when necessary, new algebraic
structures; the black box algebra efficiently constructs, when necessary, proxy struc-
tures represented by new black boxes which use given black boxes for computational
engines.
6.7. Augmentation of a black box group by a proto-involution. Semidirect
products of black box groups arise in a situation when we have two black box group
X and Y and a polynomial time in l(X) and l(Y) procedure for the action of Y on
X by automorphisms,
X× Y −→ X
(x, y) 7→ xy.
Then the semidirect product X⋊ Y is defined, in the usual way, as the set of pairs
X× Y with multiplication
(x1, y1) ◦ (x2, y2) :=
(
x1x
y
−1
1
2 , y1y2
)
.
The following theorem is very simple and very useful; it provides an “external”
version of reification of involutions, compare with Theorem 6.2.
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Theorem 6.3 (Augmentation of a black box group by a proto-involution). If F <
X×X is a proto-involution on X representing an involutive automorphism φ on G,
we can construct an involutive automorphism φ of F by setting
φ : (x, x′) 7→ (x′, x) for (x, x′) ∈ F.
Then the semidirect product F⋊ {1,φ} is a black box encrypting G⋊ 〈φ〉.
Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 can be generalized, with appropriate modification of defi-
nitions, to automorphisms of arbitrary order. They demonstrate the power of the
simple principle: in homomorphic encryption, the graph of an encrypted homomor-
phism might have a sophisticated internal structure which provides a window of
opportunity for its cryptoanalysis.
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